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that the result is bad, and urging legislative action; but statutory relief
is hardly flexible enough to cope with the situation, as previous experi-,
ence has shown.
(3) The court may regard the Kentucky cases as authority only
to the true extent of their holding, following the logical implications of
the McClary case which enjoined procurement of breach, with a resulting approach to the view taken by the Restatement' to the effect that
inducing a breach of contract in the absence of legal justification Is an
actionable wrong.
HowARD E. TRENT, J3.

SPENDTHRIFT TRUSTS; REACHING THE INTEREST OF THE
BENEFICIARY FOR ALIMONY OR SUPPORT
A wife obtained a divorce with a provision for alimony and support
for three minor children. Subsequently the husband's mother created
by will a discretionary spendthrift trust in his favor and specifically
stated that the divorced wife and the children should receive no benefit from the income of the trust. The husband failed to pay the sums
to the wife as directed in the decree and continued to refuse to comply
after the death of his mother at which time the spendthrift trust
became operative. The wife alleged that she and the children were in
indigent circumstances, while the husband had a substantial income
from the trust fund which was his only asset, and she sought support
from the income or principal of that trust.
The District Court dismissed the petition for failure to state a
cause of action and the Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed that order in
a two to one decision. The case arose in Wisconsin and as that state
had no decisions or statutes in point the majority of the court said that
they must "determine the law of that state from the rule in other
989
2 See Hackney v. Fordson Coal Co., 230 Ky. 362, 19 S. W. (2d)
(1929) (The statute making it unlawful to refuse further employment
to employees who did not deal at a particular store was construed as
being for the benefit of employees, and not as a protection for merchants
competing with the employer; thus a competing merchant was dented
recovery for loss of custom resulting from a violation of the statute);
Boulier et al. v. Macauley, 91 Ky. 135, 15 S. W. 60 (1921) supra n. 25,
exemplifies the strict interpretation given such a statute by the Kentucky Court as it applies to inducing breach of a labor contract.
"Restatement, Torts (vol. IV, 1939) sec. 766: "Except as stated in
Section 698, one who, without a privilege to do so, induces or otherwise
purposely causes a third person not to (a) perform a contract with
another, or (b) enter into or continue a business relation with another
is liable to the other for the harm caused thereby"; Id. at sec. 767: "In
determining whether there is a privilege to act in the manner stated
in Section 766, the following are important factors: (a) the nature of
the actor's conduct, (b) the nature of the expectancy with which his
conduct interferes, (c) the relations between the parties, (d) the
interest sought to be advanced by the actor and (e) the social interests
in protecting the expectancy on the one hand and the actors freedom of
action on the other hand."
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jurisdictions.... ." The court then found that by the weight of
authority the creation of a spendthrift trust which cuts off the wife and
children is not void as against public policy. As it was impossible to
find any intent of the settlor for the estranged wife to share in the
fund, she had no valid claim against it.
Judge Evans dissented on the grounds that (a) only a few states
had passed on the precise issue and that among them there was not
complete unanimity of opinion; (b) two states have statutes expressing
a contrary public policy; (c) the Restatement of the Law of Trusts
takes a view opposite to that followed in the majority opinion; (d)
since the State of Wisconsin is not bound by stare decisis and as the
reasons for reaching a contrary conclusion are more in accord with
justice, that result should be reached as a matter of public policy.
Schwager v. Schwager, 109 F. (2d) 754 (C. C. A. 7th 1940). 1
The spendthrift trust, though not recognized at common law in
England and some American jurisdictions,2 has been widely accepted in
this country since the nineteenth century.3 Several explanations have
been advanced for its origin, some of which arise from the teachings
of Kant that the purpose of law is to give the fullest possible opportunity for the expression of the human will.' the pioneer spirit in
America, and the influence of the great man in the development of the
law.6
Attempts have been made to apply the proceeds of a spendthrift
trust to the payment of alimony and in many instances in which the
wife has been successful the courts have fictionally inferred that the
settlor intended that the wife should receive a beneficial interest.8
A few courts have emphasized the social undesirability of allowing a
husband's equitable interest to be restrained so as to put it beyond the
reach of his dependents.7 Where the right to subject the fund to payment of alimony or support has been denied, it has usually been found
that the settlor did not intend for the wife to share in the benefits of
the trust estate.8 Since in the instant case it is clear that the settlor
' This case has been noted in (1940) 53 Harv. L. Rev. 1059.
2 Bogert, Trusts and Trustees (7 Vols. 1st ed. 1935) sec. 222.
'Griswold, Spendthrift Trusts (1936) secs. 51-58.
'Evans, Book Review (1936) 25 Ky. L. J. 119, 120.
Griswold, op. cit. supra n. 3, secs. 25-31.
'Griswold, op. cit. supra n. 3, sec. 334; Scott, The Law of Trusts
(4 vols. 1st ed. 1939) sec. 157.1; Note 104 A. L. R. 779 (1936); Note
(1936) 50 Harv. L. Rev. 143, 144.
7See Keller v. Keller, 284 Ill. App. 198, 1 N. E. (2d) 773 (1936),
30 Ill. L. Rev. 1067, 14 Chi-Kent Rev. 276, 50 Harv. L. Rev. 143; In re
Morehead's Estate, 289 Pa. 542, 137 At. 802 (1927); Thomas v. Thomas,
112 Pa. Super. 578, 172 Atl. 36 (1934); In re Stewarts Estate, 334 Pa.
356, 5 A. (2d) 910 (1939); Note (1939) 53 Harv. L. Rev. 296, 299, 300.
8San Diego Trust & Savings Bank v. Heustis, 121 Cal App.
675, 10 P. (2d) 158 (1932); Burrage v. Buchnam, 16 N. E. (2d) 705
(Mass. 1933); Erickson v. Erickson, 197 Minn. 71, 266 N. W. 161 (1936),
34 Mich. L. Rev. 1269; Eaton v. Eaton, 82 N. H. 216, 132 Atl. 10 (1926),
35 Yale L. J. 1025.
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did not intend that the wife should be a beneficiary either directly or
indirectly, the solution of the case depends upon whether there has
been a limitation upon the use of the property which is contra bonos
mores.
A clash of two conflicting policies presents itself. The theory,
evidenced by the exsitence of the device of the spendthrift trust, that
the owner of property may dispose of it as he sees fit is not readily
reconciled with the idea that marriage is a status in which the public
has an interest. That the right to dispose of one's property is a
privilege granted by the state is made plain by the exercise of the
sovereign's power to tax that privilege in the form of inheritance,
estate, and gift taxes.9 Probably the most obvious illustration of forbidding a settlor to dispose of his property against public policy is the
denial of the right to create a trust for capricious purposes."0 The
common law right of dower is a restriction upon a husband's absolute
right of disposal of his estate.
The spendthrift trust and similar devices make it possible for the
donor to prevent the reaching of the interest of the cestui que trust by
his contract creditors." But a husband's obligation to pay alimony and
surely his obligation to support his children are not to be classed with
his ordinary debts." The public has an added interest in securing the
payment of the claims of these dependents. The importance of the
welfare of the wife and children is not solely dependent upon a humanitarian sympathy but is a product of an interest in marriage as an
institution, and the fact that economically the state will be responsible
for the well-being of those dependents if the husband should fail to
make provision for them. This obligation of the husband does not
depend upon contract but is a duty that attaches to the status of
marriage.
It is urged that the settlor had no duty to provide for the wife and
children in the instant case; that she could have refused to have made
any provision for the son if she had believed the wife would receive a
part of the son's interest, and that the donor has the right to determine
who shall receive her property at her death. But while she had the
right to provide for the son, she cannot separate him from his obligations to his family where he has the means of supporting it. It was
alleged that the husband had no assets other than his interest in the
spendthrift trust. Without that income he would have been forced to
earn his own living and a part of his earnings would be subject to the
claim of the wife and children for support. It seems then that t~ie
selfish desire of the settlor to provide for her improvident son should
9
Willoughby, Constitutional Law of the United States, (2d ed. 1930)
sec. 896; (1926) 26 Columbia L. Rev. 737.
"Brown v. Burdett, 21 Ch. D. 667 (1882); In re Scott's Will, 88
Minn. 386, 93 N. W. 109 (1903); Scott, op. cit. supra n. 6, sec. 124.7.
1 Scott, op. cit. supra n. 6, sec. 157.
"Id. see. 157.1; Bogert, op. cit. supra n. 2, sec. 223; notes (1940)
Temp. L. Q. 229, 34 Mich. L. Rev. 1269.

STUDENT NoTs

be forced to give way to the claim of his dependents and to the interest
of the public In seeing that demand satisfied. That conclusion was
reached by the framers of the Restatement of the Law of Trusts" and
was followed in the dissenting opinion in the case under discussion."
Professor Scott has submitted a view that seems to be equitable.
He suggests that consideration should be given to the needs of the
beneficiary and to his dependents and to allow those dependents to
enforce their claim for support In an amount that would be reasonable
under all the circumstances."
Since spendthrift trusts have been recognized In some jurisdictions
without the aid of statutes,' courts of equity should mould that device
to conform with modern concepts of public policy so that the absolute
will of the settlor should not defeat a stronger public interest.Y
Though section 235"1 of the Kentucky Statutes has been construed by the Court of Appeals to mean that spendthrift trusts are
'
invalid In this state," there are methods by which much the same
result may be obtained. (1) If it is provided that the cestuw que trust
may receive only such amounts as the trustee in his absolute discretion
may direct, the creditors of the beneficiary will not be allowed to reach
(2) The court has held valid a
the fund until it is received by him'
provision by the settlor that the trust shall cease or that the beneficial
interest shall go over if that interest is held to be subject to the claims
of creditors of the cestui que trust." (3) Where the beneficial interest
is given to two or more persons jointly, it has been held that the fund
could not be reached by the creditors of one of the beneficiaries."
"Restatement, Trusts (1935) sec. 157(a): "Although a trust is a
spendthrift trust or a trust for support, the interest of the beneficiary
can be reached in satisfaction of an enforceable claim against the beneficiary, by the wife or child of the beneficiary for support, or by the
wife for alimony."
" Schwager v. Schwager, 109 F. (2d) 754, 761 (1940).
Scott, op. cit. supra n. 6, sec. 157.1; (1936) 50 Harv. L. Rev. 60, 70.
"Griswold, op. cit. supra n. 3, sec. 54.
See Costigan, Spendthrift Trusts Reexamined, (1934) 22 Calif.
L. Rev. 471, 488. Griswold, op. cit. supra n. 3, sec. 565 proposes a
model statute for the authorizing and regulating of spendthrift trusts.
In section 3(c) of that draft he adopts a provision similar to section
167 of the Restatement.
"Ky. Stat. (Carroll, 1936).
"Ratliff's Exrs. v. Commmonwealth, 139 Ky. 533, 101 S. W. 978
(1907).
See Keith v. First Natl. Bank & Trust Co., 256 Ky. 88, 75
S. W. (2d) 747 (1934).
Louisville Tobacco Warehouse Co. v. Thompson, 172 Ky. 350,
See Dept. of Public Welfare v. Meek, 264 Ky.
189 S. W. 245 (1916).
771, 95 S. W. (2d) 599, 601 (1936); Griswold, op. cit. supra n. 3, sec.
186, 583. U!f.
Montgomery v. Offutt, 136 Ky. 157, 123 S. W. 676 (1909).
2Bull v. Kentucky Natl. Bank, 90 Ky. 542, 14 S. W. 425 (1890).
See Auxier's Ex. v. Theobald, 255 Ky. 583, 75 S. W. (2d) 39, 42 (1934);
Griswold, op. cit. supra n. 3, sec. 583.
Hackett's Trustee v. Hackett, 146 Ky. 408, 141 S. W. 673 (1912);
Russell v. Meyers, 202 Ky. 593, 260 S. W. 377 (1924); Griswold, op. cit.
supra n. 3, sec. 186; Evans, supra n. 4 at 120. Could Ford v. Ford,
infra n. 28 come within this classification?
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(4) Since Kentucky allows restraints on alienation that are reasonable,' it is possible in this state for a settlor to prevent a voluntary
transfer of the equitable interest by the cestui que trust which would
be void in most jurisdictions.2 ' However, such a provision is not effective to limit the rights of the beneficiary's creditors.2
In Todd's Exrs. v. Todd"l the testatrix combined the first two of
these methods and gave property to her son in trust for his life. The
divorced wife of the son attempted to apply his interest to the payxient
of an award she had received for the support of herself and her children. The court refused to allow the wife to recover on the ground
that the trustee had absolute discretion in the -matter of payments to
the beneficiary. Whether any distinction should be made between
dependents and creditors of the cestUi que trust was not discussed,
most of the opinion being devoted to a consideration of whether the
settlor had created a spendthrift trust.
Two noted authorities27 have cited the case of Ford v Ford,28 as
allowing dependents to reach a spendthrift trust or a trust for support.
The husband was required to pay an amount for the support of his
children from his interest in a discretionary trust, but upon a careful
examination of the decision it is found that this was allowed because
the settlor did not provide for a limitation over if the creditors of the
husband should try to subject his interest to their claims. There is
also indication that if the testator had vested the trustee with absolute
discretion the wife would not have recovered. The right of the wife
to reach the interest of cestui que trust for the payment of alimony was
not passed upon.
The reasons for not giving effect to a stipulation that a divorced
wife may not reach the husband's beneficial interest for the payment
of alimony under a spendthrift trust should also prevent the settlor
from accomplishing the same result by using one of the devices that
the Kentucky Court has recognized.
R. VINCENT GOODLETT.

=Evans, supra n. 4, 120; Roberts, Future Interests in Kentucky
(1925) 13 Ky. L. J. 186, 195-199; Griswold, op. cit. supra n. 3, sec. 186.
2Ibid. See also Muir's Exrs. v. Howard, 178 Ky. 51, 19 S. W.
551 (1917). But see Keith v. First Natl. Bank & Trust Co., 256 Kl
88, 75 S. W. (2d) 747, 749 (1934).
Smith v. Smith, 115 Ky. 329, 73 S. W. 1028.
2260 Ky. 611, 86 S. W. (2d) 168 (1935) noted in (1936) 11 Tulane
L. Rev. 149.
"Scott, op. cit. supra n. 6, sec. 157.1, n. 1; Griswold, op. cit. supra
n. 2, sec. 339, n. 32.
"8230 Ky. 56, 18 S. W. (2d) 859 (1929) noted in (1930) 18 Ky.
L. J. 399 (statement of case seems inaccurate), (1929) 28 Mich. L.
Rev. 217.

